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Abstract
Consumption surveys often record zero purchases of a good because of a short observation
window. Measures of distribution are then precluded and only mean consumption rates can
be inferred. We show that Propensity Score Matching can be applied to recover the distribu-
tion of consumption rates. We demonstrate the method using the UK National Travel Sur-
vey, in which c.40% of motorist households purchase no fuel. Estimated consumption rates
are plausible judging by households’ annual mileages, and highly skewed. We apply the
same approach to estimate CO2 emissions and outcomes of a carbon cap or tax. Reliance
on means apparently distorts analysis of such policies because of skewness of the underly-
ing distributions. The regressiveness of a simple tax or cap is overstated, and redistributive
features of a revenue-neutral policy are understated.
Introduction
A potential problem in survey sampling is that a phenomenon of interest occurs infrequently
relative to the period in which data is collected, leading to zero-inflated data. There are many
circumstances in which this can arise. For example, if a wildlife survey runs camera traps for a
short time, negative results may obtain even where a target species is known to reside [1]. In
the social sciences a key example is purchase infrequency. This occurs when a consumption
diary is used to record buying over a relatively short duration, typically 1–2 weeks. Sampled
households often record no purchase, even if they are known to consume the good in question.
All households consume clothing, but many will not make purchases in a given two weeks,
which is the period in the UK’s Living Costs and Food Survey for example.
Consumption surveys aim to measure rates of consumption, which unlike quantities pur-
chased do not depend on the length of the observation window. The same drinking rate, for
example, can be expressed as 1 pint per day, 7 pints per week or 365 pints per year. In a well-
designed and executed survey, the estimated mean consumption rate is not biased by purchase
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infrequency. For zeroes will tend to be counterbalanced by positive values that, if interpreted
as consumption rates, would be too high. For example, if each household used a 2l bottle of
milk every 2 weeks, an ideal survey with a 1 week diary would be expected to record 50% of
units with no purchase and 50% purchasing 2l. The expected mean rate of 1l per week is cor-
rect, but no entry would record 1l. The data are therefore uninformative about a given house-
hold’s consumption rate, and therefore about any other statistic than the mean. For many
questions of social and political interest, there is therefore a relative paucity of information. A
good example (analysed later in this paper) is CO2 emissions reduction policy, including car-
bon taxes or caps. One would like to estimate quantiles of the financial impact of such a policy,
to judge its potential regressiveness and likely resistance to its implementation, for example.
But key variables needed for the analysis, including consumption of flights and motor fuels,
exhibit acute purchase infrequency.
A substantial literature on infrequent purchase exists in econometrics [2], with the follow-
ing characteristics. Studies estimate either Engel curves or demand equations often targeting a
complete system of equations for different types of good, accounting for a household’s budget
[3–12]. Infrequent purchase is dealt with by specifying separate equations for the purchasing
decision and for budget share, expenditure or quantity, which are estimated jointly. As more
than one potential explanation exists for a given zero purchase, and information is usually not
available on, for example, who actively abstains from a particular good, identifying assump-
tions are required for different categories of zeros. These features imply sophistication but also
relatively large numbers of parameters, and rely on a priori model specifications. Gibson and
Kim [13] test several of the infrequent purchase models, using a dataset containing both stock
use and purchasing decisions, arguing that they exhibit substantial biases. Whether or not
these models are inherently biased, we find it plausible that they can be mis-specified for the
data to hand, so there is a need for credible specification checks.
Our aim is more limited and descriptive than such demand modelling, namely to recover
the distribution of consumption rates of one good under purchase infrequency. This restricted
goal enables a simpler approach. In common with many of the econometric models we esti-
mate a purchase decision equation via a binary regression model. But the quantitative aspect is
here dealt with by matching, avoiding the additional assumptions on functional form and
error structure required by a second regression equation. Our proposal complements the exist-
ing methods in two ways. Firstly, one can predict values of a dependent variable using an esti-
mated quantity regression equation and compare the values obtained to those derived by
matching. This provides a model specification check. If the distributions are markedly differ-
ent one might try, for example, a different functional form or error structure. Given the rela-
tive simplicity of matching, it is reasonable for the burden of achieving conformity to fall on
the econometric model.
Secondly, matching is reliant on a condition of “common support” [14]. This condition is
also important for an econometric model, since if it is not satisfied, counterfactual behaviour
will be estimated on observations of dissimilar respondents [15]. Matching algorithms report
on common support and therefore indicate whether quantitative regression involves such
extrapolation. We apply Propensity Score Matching (PSM) [14] to estimate the distribution of
rates of consumption. This is, to our knowledge, a novel application of PSM. Little [16] applies
propensity score weighting to missing data problems in sample surveys, but does not consider
purchase infrequency. The latter is not a missing data problem, since it arises even if purchase
diaries are fully completed. We derive the theoretical case for using PSM to impute consump-
tion rates in the next section. We then estimate household motor fuel consumption rates using
data from the UK’s National Travel Survey (NTS) and evaluate the imputation statistically.
Here we exploit favourable features of the NTS to defend against the common criticism of
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PSM that relevant factors are excluded from the binary regression model. We then extend the
analysis to study emissions reduction policies for household motor fuels.
Theory: using PSM to estimate consumption rates under
infrequency of purchase
Let Z denote a binary event; Z = 1 if a motorist household purchased fuel and Z = 0 otherwise.
Let r denote a potential survey outcome, the quantity of fuel purchased conditional on Z = 1. If
Z = 1, r is recorded, as the fuel purchase value in the dataset, otherwise 0 is recorded and r is
unknown. We first estimate the missing values of r. We then use r in conjunction with propen-
sity scores to estimate consumption rates, c. For households without vehicles, c 0. The sam-
pling approach here, restricting attention to vehicle owners, is identical to that in regular
applications of PSM. For example, a study constructing a control group to analyse a smoking
intervention will estimate the propensity score on a sample of smokers to control for self-selec-
tion into the intervention, with non-smokers falling outside the population of interest [17–19].
A propensity score, psi(X), is the conditional probability that Z occurs, given a vector of
observed characteristics X of a unit of observation i. Rosenbaum and Rubin [14] show that the
ps is a ‘balancing score’, meaning that the distribution of X will tend to be the same for random
samples of units with the same value of ps(X), whether Z = 1 or Z = 0. That is,
X ? ZjpsðXÞ ð1Þ
Balancing in this sense is a large sample property of ps. The true ps is always unknown and can
only be estimated, for example using a binary regression model. Rosenbaum and Rubin [14]
also show that ps can be used to correct for certain kinds of selection biases. The usual applica-
tion is in the estimation of effect sizes for observational studies, to control for self-selection
into a treatment group. Here in contrast we account for self-selection into the category of pur-
chasers during a diary window. The key conditions required to estimate the sample distribu-
tion of r are
r ? ZjX
and
8X 0 < pðZ ¼ 1jXÞ < 1
ð2Þ
(2) is known as ‘strong ignorability’. The first part means there are no unobserved confound-
ers, that is, unrecorded variables that affect both the probability of purchase and the quantity r.
The second part, common support, means that there is no X such that Z is perfectly predict-
able. Given (2) it also follows that
r ? ZjpsðXÞ
and
8X 0 < pðZ ¼ 1jpsðXÞÞ < 1
ð3Þ
From (1), estimated propensity scores, bpsðXÞ, of sufficient quality can always be used to bal-
ance samples on their observed characteristics. (3) implies additionally that each household i:
Z = 0, can be matched with a household j: Z = 1 with approximately the same value of bpsðXÞ to
estimate an unobserved value of r:
br i:Zi¼0 ¼ rj:bpsjðXÞffibpsiðXÞ; Zj¼1 ð4Þ
where the relationship of proximity in estimated propensity scores, "ffi", is operationalised by a
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matching algorithm. Note that is not sufficient to multiply ps by r for the households that pur-
chased fuel, to recover the distribution of consumption rates. For households that purchased
are systematically different from motorist households that did not, having on average higher
purchase probability and therefore higher probable consumption. PSM corrects for this differ-
ence and enables a full dataset of consumption rates to be estimated.
The matched, purchasing households thus provide an estimate of the set of unobserved val-
ues of r. The quality of these estimates, given (2), will depend on both sample size and the qual-
ity of the estimated propensity scores. Here r represents the quantity purchased conditional on
a purchase occurring in the diary window. We refer to r as the ‘quantity at the pump’ to distin-
guish it from the consumption rate, c. How long a household takes to consume a given quan-
tity is inversely proportional to its probability of purchasing. Each quantity is therefore
multiplied by the corresponding estimated ps to yield an estimated rate of consumption,bc.
That is, values given by
bci ¼
bpsiðXÞ:ri if Zi ¼ 1
bpsiðXÞ:bri if Zi ¼ 0
ð5Þ
constitute the estimated distribution of consumption rates. Althoughbc and br are subscripted it
is important to realise that a given imputed value is not an estimate for that household, since
each value of the scalar ps(X) is associated with a distribution of realisations of the vector X,
not a specific configuration. At each propensity score, that is, there is still heterogeneity, but it
is unrelated to Z. PSM therefore results in group-level matching: a set of households is identi-
fied with a covariate structure which is expected to be identical to that of the Z = 0 households.
Our application of PSM to infer the distributions ofbr andbc is distinct from use of PSM for
causal inference in observational studies. Firstly, in the latter context inferences from PSM
generally only concern a mean, usually the mean effect of some intervention, rather than indi-
vidual effects. This is because each effect is the difference between two potential outcomes, and
one of these is unknown for each unit. Individual-level matching would be required to esti-
mate individual effects and quantiles of the distribution. In the present setting, only one poten-
tial outcome is of interest, and it is unknown only for a subset of units. Secondly, in the causal
inference problem the propensity score is only used to match units, whereas here it is used
both for matching and to discount values for purchase infrequency. This implies a stronger
condition for bpsðXÞ to satisfy, since (2) can be satisfied even if there is omitted variable bias in
the estimation of the probability of purchase. Suppose for example that all households pur-
chased the same quantity (r) whenever they bought a particular good. Then (2) would be
always be satisfied regardless of the quality of the propensity score model. We therefore make
explicit a distinct assumption:
bpsðXÞ is an unbiased estimator of pðZ ¼ 1Þ ð6Þ
(6) implies (2) and (3), since if (6) holds there is (for example) no omitted variable bias, so
there are no unobserved determinants of Z correlated with X, and therefore no such determi-
nants of r and Z.
Estimating the distribution of fuel consumption using PSM and the
UK National Travel Survey
Extent of infrequency of purchase
We consider data from the UK National Travel Survey (NTS), pooling data for years 2002–
2008 to achieve a large sample size. NTS data in the unbanded format used here can be
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obtained on request and under license through the UK government’s Department for Trans-
port, at NATIONAL.TRAVELSURVEY@dft.gsi.gov.uk. The NTS is ideally suited for study of
infrequent purchase for the following reasons. Firstly, given its diary window of one week
many households do not purchase fuel. Secondly, it also records annual mileage for each vehi-
cle in the survey interview, which provides a crude proxy for fuel consumption. Finally, the
data concerned are policy-relevant, particularly for environmental and energy policy, so prac-
tical consequences of the data problem are salient.
Concerning the extent of infrequent purchase, the sample comprises a total of 57,069 fully-
cooperating households. Of these, 42,712 have vehicles, either cars, vans or motorbikes, but
17,485 (41%) did not buy fuel during the diary week. Only 70 vehicle-owning households actu-
ally report zero annual mileage. So only around 0.2% of motoring households in the sample
should have no fuel consumption and almost all the recorded zeroes result from infrequency
of purchase. Histograms of the diary data and mileage data are shown in Fig 1 below. The
diary data show a spike at zero and an extended tail to the right of the mean.
We have no reason to believe the mean purchase is a biased estimator of the mean con-
sumption rate (n2). Given the mileage data, however, the distribution of fuel consumption
rates cannot resemble that in the left histogram of Fig 1. We anticipate a strong, direct relation-
ship between the true distribution of mileage and the true distribution of fuel consumption
rates. For, given the fuel efficiency of a vehicle, there is a determinate quantity of fuel required
for a given journey. Consumption rates should therefore exhibit a distribution resembling that
in the right histogram. The mileage data are not unproblematic, however, as the distribution
has modes at multiples of 5000 miles, arising from over-reporting of salient numbers.
One could estimate fuel consumption directly from the mileage data, but there are serious
disadvantages to doing so. Firstly, the NTS contains only discrete information relevant to the
fuel efficiency. The relevant variables are a binary indicator of engine size (>1500 cc), a five-
fold categorisation of vehicle type, and fuel type (diesel versus petrol) for each vehicle. Whereas
Fig 1. Sample distributions of motorist households’ fuel purchases and mileage, NTS 2002–2008. Notes: 1. The NTS reports
mileage separately for each vehicle. The figure is obtained by aggregating over vehicles. 2. Censored at the 99th percentile.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.g001
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for any given vehicle annual mileage we can expect a continuous distribution of fuel consump-
tion rates. Secondly, the salient number bias would produce a multi-modal distribution ofbc.
Our strategy instead is to use the mileage variable as one resource for matching-based estima-
tion amongst other covariates.
Table 1 below sets out the occurrence of purchases in the sample by equivalised income,
using the ‘square root scale’ [20]. Whilst vehicle ownership is less common amongst less afflu-
ent households, the likelihood of non-purchase given ownership is higher. This implies that
the divergence between the sample distribution of fuel purchases and that of the latent variable
c is greater amongst less affluent motoring households. However, the problem is pronounced
everywhere. Amongst the top income quintile, for example, 1/3 of motoring households have
no recorded purchase and purchases exceed weekly consumption rates by a mean factor of
~1.5. This is calculated as the reciprocal of the mean purchase probability (= 1/(1–0.335) since
33.5% of motorist households in the top income quintile purchase no fuel, from Table 1).
Using PSM to recover ‘quantities at the pump’
The PSM is conducted using the vehicle-owning households only. Matching with replacement
was applied, with a caliper of 0.01, using the psmatch2 routine in STATA [21]. In this app-
roach, bps is the fitted value of a probit regression model. Each household which did not buy
fuel is matched using bps to one that did, but the same match can be used more than once. This
procedure is heterogeneity-preserving, which is appropriate here since we are attempting to
recover an entire distribution.
Two probit models were developed. The results are shown in a coefficient plot [22] in Fig 2
below. Model 1 makes full use of relevant covariate information in the NTS excluding the
annual mileage variable. Although the NTS has not been collected to estimate fuel purchase
propensity, it provides a rich set of relevant variables. We exclude mileage to see how the
PSM-based imputation fares in the absence of a proxy for the imputed variable, since this will
be the usual research situation. Square terms for age and numbers of adults are included, plus
an interaction term for working households with children, since these were found to improve
goodness of fit and matching quality. Model 2 simply adds the mileage variable as a regressor.
This should help to correct for missing covariate information.
Fig 3 below shows the distributions of bps in models 1 and 2, respectively, using kernel den-
sity plots. Common support is approximately satisfied. For there are no unmatched house-
holds under model 1, and under model 2, just 3 households are unmatched because of the 1%
bps caliper we apply, and dropped. We regard this proportion as negligible.
The pronounced multi-modal distribution of model 1 propensity scores (Fig 3) is attribut-
able to particular constellations of covariates with high-valued regression coefficients: two
Table 1. Extent of infrequency of purchase by income quintile.
Quintile of equivalised income % of households with motor vehicles % of motoring households with no fuel purchase
1 35.9 56.3
2 69.4 49.1
3 83.7 42.1
4 93.2 35.4
5 94.3 33.5
Notes
1. motoring households are defined as those owning at least one motor vehicle (car, van or motorcycle).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.t001
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Fig 2. Coefficient plot of probit regression models of fuel purchase in the diary week. Notes. 1. Probit coefficients are
shown as diamonds with lines representing confidence intervals. 2. Continuous regressors are standardised to have mean
zero and unit variance. 3. Household-level variables are derived from individual- and vehicle-level data (authors’ calculations).
4. A dummy for each top-coded variable is included in the estimations but not shown. 5. For model 1 McFadden’s pseudo r-sq
(adjusted) = 0.053, count r-sq (adjusted) = 0.11 and Log-L = -27250.28. Model 2 has 2 additional parameters; McFadden’s
Estimating consumption rates using propensity scores
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adult, two car, rural households with children, for example. Within such groups the distribu-
tions are approximately unimodal.
Model 1 shows results which are generally in line with expectations, with positive coeffi-
cients for the number of driving licence holders, adults and children, the number of vehicles,
distance from a train station and rural location, for example. Negative coefficients for diesel
and motorcycles presumably reflect fuel efficiency. Model 1 performs poorly though, in terms
of balance between the matched groups on the annual mileage variable. A visualisation of
covariate balance is provided in Fig 4 below. Standardised percentage bias [23] is shown before
and after matching for each coefficient, in order of pre-matching bias.
Covariates that are included in the regression have very low standardised biases (less than
2%). (Austin [24], for example, reports that standardised bias of less than 10% are regarded as
low in applied work.) However, mileage, the coefficient at the bottom, shows the highest bias,
exceeding 20%. Using bps from model 1, therefore, we obtain matched groups with significantly
different mean mileage and, therefore, systematically different actual ps. This violates our
requirement (6).
In model 2, the coefficient on mileage dominates the regression. Given the physical rela-
tionship between mileage and fuel consumption this is unsurprising. Since many of the inde-
pendent variables are determinants of mileage, some coefficients change sign or become
insignificant. Comparing (nested) models 1 and 2, conventional model selection criteria
favour model 2 (note 5 to Fig 2).
Both models return seemingly “low” values of pseudo r-squared, but given the inherently
stochastic data this does not evidence poor predictive performance. To illustrate this, recall
that 60% of vehicle owners purchased fuel in the randomly-determined diary week, so that the
sample mean purchase frequency is approximately 6 out of 10 weeks, a probability of purchase
of 0.6. Two individuals with this purchase frequency will have identical in-sample behaviour
only with probability 0.52 (= 0.62 for purchase + 0.42 for non-purchase). Therefore even a
model which predicts purchase probability perfectly would be unable to predict whether a
household actually purchased fuel across much of the dataset. Our objective for the PS model
is to predict the purchase probability, not the act of purchase. For comparison, another context
where event predictability is limited is nonresponse models, where values of McFadden’s
pseudo r-squared well below 0.1 are quite normal [25, 26].
Whilst pseudo r-squared retains a comparative value for model selection, the covariate bal-
ance achieved is important in an absolute sense. Fig 4 indicates that the two groups are now
well-matched on mileage, with only a slight worsening of the bias metric on the other indepen-
dent variables. From this point on we therefore concentrate exclusively on model 2 estimates
in the remaining figures and substantive discussion, and make reference to model 1 only for
methodological purposes. A counterpart to each figure below is presented in the Supporting
Information using model 1 estimates for comparison (Figs A-E in S1 File).
Having constructed the matched groups using PSM (with model 2), we take values forbr
from the matched set of Z = 1 households as stipulated in Eq (4). Thus, for households ob-
served to buy fuel, we have recorded values of r and for Z = 0 households we have PSM esti-
mates of quantities they would have bought, had they made a purchase,br . Values of r andbr are
shown in Fig 5 below.
Fig 5 shows greater frequency of lower quantities amongst non-purchasing households.
This is consistent with the difference in propensity scores between the two groups (Fig 4), and
pseudo r-sq (adjusted) = 0.078, count r-sq (adjusted) = 0.16. and Log-L -26534.82. The LLR statistic is therefore
1430.92~χ2(2); p<0.001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.g002
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an association between Z and r prior to controlling for X. Also noticeable is the pronounced
multi-modality of the distribution, with modes at multiples of 10 litres. Presumably this
reflects a combination of over-reporting, and actually purchasing, salient numbers. Modes at
12–13 and 24–26 litres may be explained as follows. From 2002–2005, the price of petrol was
roughly £0.80p per litre [27]. Thus, each £10 spent on petrol would result in a purchase of
around 12.5 litres for half the period under consideration.
Fig 5 also illustrates the heterogeneity-preserving quality of the matching-based imputation
procedure. The same pattern of modes at salient numbers is evident for both observed and
imputed purchases.
Estimated fuel consumption rates
Having derived quantities at the pump, the next step is to multiply each quantity by its associ-
ated propensity score to obtain estimated consumption rates,bc, as specified in Eq (5). The
resulting estimates are shown in Fig 6 and summarised in Table 2 below, alongside estimates
using bps from model 1, the diary fuel purchase and annual mileage variables.
Standard errors for fuel consumption in Table 2 are calculated by bootstrapping, incorpo-
rating variation associated with the ps estimation and matching. Regular bootstrapping in this
context fails to reproduce the distribution of times a unit is used as a match, fi [28]. We avoid
this problem by adding a small random error, e, to bps after drawing each bootstrap sample but
Fig 3. Estimated propensity scores: kernel density estimates. Note: Epanechnikov kernel.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.g003
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before conducting the ps matching. This resolves the problem in theory, given values of e small
enough for Eq (4) still to hold but large enough to perturb the match selected.
The distribution used was e~N(0, 1/30625). We selected parameters for e which approxi-
mately reproduce the distribution of fi without detriment to the standardised bias metric of
matching quality, by trial and error (Table A in S1 File). We also tested our bootstrap proce-
dure using Monte Carlo simulation (Table B in S1 File). The bootstrap standard errors for the
mean and quantiles of the distribution approximate standard deviations of the corresponding
variables derived using simulated samples, but those for standard deviation and skewness do
not, a problem which seems attributable at least in part to skewness of c (notes to Table B in S1
File). We therefore include standard errors only for the mean and percentiles in Table 2. We
offer the following observations on the quality of the preferred estimates (Table 2, column 4).bc
approximately equals the mean fuel purchase (26.06 litres versus 26.03 litres respectively), as
Fig 4. Standardised percentage bias between covariates in Z = 0 and Z = 1 households. Notes. 1. Covariates are those shown in Fig 2, less square
and interaction terms, plus topcode dummies. 2. The mean, median and maximum absolute standardised % bias are 1.1, 0.6 and 22.7 for model 1 and 1.0,
0.7 and 3.3 for model 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.g004
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required. At the same level of granularity, the multimodality of Fig 5 is absent from Fig 6,
which is reassuring since it is unlikely that c is affected by salient number biases. The distribu-
tion also appears plausible judging the mileage proxy. Let Q1, Q2 and Q3 denote the 25th,
50th and 75th percentiles of a distribution respectively. The proportional relationships Q1/Q2
and Q1/Q3 are identical for mileage andbc to one decimal place. For a more detailed compari-
son we present quantile-quantile plots in Fig 7, normalising by dividing each value by the max-
imum of the variable.
The left plot of Fig 7 shows that the quantiles ofbc are located somewhat lower in their
range, than are quantiles of mileage. For example, Q3 fuel consumption is .07 of the maximum
value (32.5/469). Q3 mileage is .12 of the maximum value (18,000/153,000). Thus one point in
the above plot is (.07, .12). Since for both variables the 99th percentile is less than 0.35 of the
maximum value, the right plot is drawn for percentiles 1–99 only. This confirms that values
are somewhat more concentrated at lower areas of the range for fuel consumption, consistent
with the difference in skewness shown in Table 2. This may be associated with features of the
Fig 5. Quantities at the pump (litres) derived from PSM using model 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.g005
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distribution of vehicle fuel efficiency. However, in both cases the plots do not deviate dramati-
cally from the 45-degree line and the larger deviation concerns the top 1% of observations.
Estimated fuel consumption rates without a proxy variable
Our preferred estimates derive from model 2, which includes a proxy (mileage) for the target
variable (fuel consumption). Normally a researcher would lack this, so it is appropriate to
reflect further on the quality of the estimates obtained without the proxy, using model 1. The
corresponding quantile-quantile plots using estimates from model 1 are very similar to Fig 7.
They show a greater deviation from the 45 degree line for the full range plot, and less deviation
from it for the first 99 percentiles (Fig A in S1 File). From Table 2, although the percentiles
obtained under the two models are generally significantly different, this is attributable to the
large sample size. The absolute differences inbc are fractions of a litre per week excepting at the
upper tail, and the mean is approximately the same. Thus, even without the mileage proxy
included in the ps estimation the estimates seem plausible.
PSM using model 1 matches households with systematically different actual fuel use, since
they have systematically different mileage (Fig 4, left). Ignorability, (3), may approximately
hold without including mileage in X, however, since it is a condition on r, not c. Consistently
Fig 6. Preferred estimates of fuel consumption rates, derived from model 2. Notes. 1. Kernel density estimates (Epanechnikov kernel) overlaid.
2. Excludes top percentile.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.g006
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with this, the distributions shown in Fig 5 are very similar if we use model 1 estimates (Fig B in
S1 File; the estimates differ by 1l at the median and 1.2l at the mean, about 3% in each case).
It therefore seems probable that under model 1, draws from very similar distributions of
quantities occur to those under model 2. But the spread of bps under model 1 may be relatively
narrow. This is consistent with the higher standard deviation ofbc under model 2 (Table 2),
and the larger variance in bps (Fig 3). It seems from the plausibility of the model 1 distribution
that the resulting errors are counterbalanced to a significant degree. This may not be surpris-
ing, given that with an appropriately designed and implemented sample survey we have an
unbiased estimate of ps (= Z) prior to any modelling of the purchase decision. The case studied
therefore seems encouraging from the perspective of the researcher who lacks a proxy for the
target variable. For it seems that omitted variable bias in the ps model may sometimes have lit-
tle effect on the bulk of the estimated distribution. However, the two sets of estimates are more
divergent at the highest quantiles of estimated consumption. This may be because model 1
underestimates the occurrence of households for whom ps>0.75 (Fig 3).
Application to emissions reduction policy
Estimation of UK household CO2 emissions from motor vehicles
Given increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, it is interesting to consider
the relevance of our results to discussions of household CO2 emissions, particularly since infre-
quent purchase has constrained their analysis. On UK households’ greenhouse missions, see
for example Gough et al. [29] and Bu¨chs and Schnepf [30]. We calculated CO2 emissions of
each vehicle using the fuel purchase diary and DECC / DEFRA emissions factors [31], using
separate figures for petrol and diesel. These figures were then aggregated to yield motoring
emissions for each household. The resulting estimates suffer from essentially the same infre-
quency of purchase problem outlined above, and are treated in the same way. That is, we
Table 2. Estimates from PSM based imputation, recorded fuel purchase and mileage.
Statistic Fuel purchase in diary
week (litres)
Annual mileage
(thousand miles)
Weekly fuel consumption from
PS model 1
Weekly fuel consumption from PS model
2 (preferred)
percentile
1
0 0.7 3.1 (0.11) 2.6 (0.10)
5 0 2 5.1 (0.08) 4.6 (0.08)
10 0 3 6.7 (0.09) 6.1 (0.09)
25 0 6 11.2 (0.12) 10.4 (0.12)
50 18 10 19.1 (0.15) 18.3 (0.15)
75 40 18 32.7 (0.26) 32.5 (0.25)
90 67 28 54.5 (0.55) 55.3 (0.51)
95 90 35 71.2 (0.75) 75.6 (0.74)
99 142 54 115.1 (1.77) 124.5 (2.13)
mean 26.0 13.7 26.1(0.18) 26.1 (0.16)
std 33.1 11.3 23.4 25.2
skewness 2.4 2.1 2.9 3.0
N 42600 42707 42598 42595
Notes
1. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, with 1000 repetitions. See main text and note 8 for discussion.
2. N varies across columns because of missing NTS data. In addition, 3 observations cannot be matched using model 2 under the 1% ps caliper restriction
applied.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.t002
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substitute the emissions quantity for each Z = 0 household with the value obtained for its ps-
matched observation, using model 2 estimates, and then multiply each emissions quantity by
its estimated ps. The resulting estimates, bd , are strongly isomorphic tobc, since emissions are
simply a multiple of the amount of each fuel purchased representing its carbon content. Mean
Fig 7. Quantile-quantile plots of estimated fuel consumption rates against recorded annual mileage. Note Values have been divided by the
maximum of the range.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.g007
Table 3. Decile shares of UK motorist households’ CO2 emissions from motor fuels.
Emissions Decile % share (SE) Cumulative % share
1 1.7 (.03) 1.7
2 2.9 (.04) 4.5
3 4.1 (.05) 8.4
4 5.2 (.05) 13.4
5 6.4 (.06) 19.6
6 7.9 (.07) 27.3
7 9.8 (.08) 37.0
8 12.5 (.11) 49.5
9 17.3 (.16) 66.9
10 32.4 (.34) 100
Note. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, with 1000 repetitions. See main text and note 8 for
discussion.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.t003
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(median) annual motoring emissions over the period are calculated to be 2.4 (1.5)t CO2 per
household, or 3.2 (2.2)t CO2 per motorist household.
Of particular interest is the estimated concentration of emissions, a notable study having
reported that they are disproportionately accounted for by a relatively small group of high-
emissions households [32]. We summarise estimated shares of vehicle CO2 emissions by
(emissions) decile in Table 3 below.
This breakdown confirms the concentration of vehicle emissions, with an estimated 1/2 of
motor fuel CO2 accounted for by the top quintile, and 1/3 by the top decile alone. The advan-
tage of our estimates is that they are based on a national representative survey. Brand and
Boardman used a local sample survey conducted in Oxfordshire coupled with an online sur-
vey, so the estimates have an ambiguous geographic and statistical status. The authors also
report a ratio between the top and bottom quintiles of 15:1. Our estimate for the UK is lower,
but still remarkable, at 10.9:1 with 95% c.i. (10.5 x 11.2):1 (±1.96 x bootstrap standard
error).
As Brand and Boardman [32] suggest, the policy implication of the high concentration of
emissions is that reducing those of a relatively small proportion of (generally richer) high emit-
ting households would be highly effective in terms of tackling overall emissions. In absolute
terms the policies usually discussed, namely carbon taxes and carbon rationing, would both
affect higher emitting households more, but operate regardless of income per se. How such
policies would affect different income groups has therefore attracted much attention [33]. The
literature has been unable to estimate the spread of policy impacts within different income
bands, however, since the available national surveys are all affected by infrequent purchase. So
although mean effects have been estimated by income group, it is not known how representa-
tive these are. That they may be heavily influenced by relatively extreme values is suggested by
the high skewness ofbc in Table 2. For further insight we use our estimates of bd and covariate
information in a simple simulation of emissions reduction policy.
Motor fuel emissions reduction policies
Static microsimulation. Ideally one would conduct a sophisticated policy simulation
incorporating behavioural responses and a model of the economy [34]. Examples include
REMI [35] for emissions reduction policies for the USA, and Comhar [36] for transport fuel
policies in the Republic of Ireland. But that would constitute a complex study in its own right,
and introduce many additional sources of uncertainty. Instead we use the simplest approach,
static microsimulation to illustrate directly the value of our method.
Static microsimulation is an attempt to show effects of an intervention without taking pos-
sible behavioural change into account. It is a widely-used policy analysis tool, especially in
research that examines possible distributional effects of taxes and benefits. Examples include
applications of the European static microsimulation tax and benefit model Euromod [37–39],
and studies estimating effects of financial instruments for energy or emissions reduction
[40,41].
In essence, we calculate ‘who stands to lose how much’ under a policy. Such analysis is fre-
quent in the media and offers a starting point for policy evaluation. It offers insights into policy
resistance / acceptance, and is an important step towards analysis of regressivity. It provides
insight into probable early effects, since behaviour and the economy take time to change. It
can be especially informative if behaviours are shaped by physical infrastructures and/or social
norms which usually change slowly, and if alternative travel modes are poor substitutes. Argu-
ably, these are characteristic features of motor vehicle use, accounting for low price elasticity of
fuel consumption, with a typical developed country study estimating around 2.5% reduction
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in fuel demand following a 10% increase in price after 1 year [42]. In our concluding section,
we nonetheless go beyond static microsimulation to offer some reflections on how behaviour
might react to different policy variants.
For recent discussion of emissions reductions policies, including implementation issues,
see Sorrell [43]. Two such policies are considered here. The first is a carbon tax or tradeable
ration / cap. Taxes and caps would have very important differences in practice, since taxes
have uncertain impact on emissions, whereas a cap has uncertain effects on prices. But the two
policies are analytically equivalent within our framework. Thus, we assume either that a tax is
levied at a certain rate without behavioural response, or that fuel use is capped at current levels
and price responds by an assumed amount because of scarcity at the margin as consumers
have to buy permits. We will assume £100/tCO2 as the tax rate (or price increase). The second
policy is the same tax or ration implemented in revenue- neutral form. That is, the carbon rev-
enue is allocated to the households on an equal per-capita basis, with each adult aged 16 or
over allocated an equal share. Tax and ration / cap variants of this policy are known as ‘tax and
dividend’ [44] or ‘cap and share’ [36] respectively. A household’s net payment, v, is defined as
its payment for carbon content of its fuel, t, minus its income from per-adult revenue shares.
Since our estimates are derived using matched groups, we cannot identify a Z = 1 household
a given Z = 0 household is matched to. We need household-level information though, to calcu-
late outcomes by income decile and / or as proportions of income. We address this problem
exploiting property (1) of ps: the structure of observed covariates in the matched controls, for a
large sample and true ps, is identical in expectation to that in the original group. Income is an
observed covariate, included as a regressor to calculate bps. We therefore substitute the Z = 0
households for the matched controls, dropping the former from the dataset. In the next 2 sub-
sections we report estimates of (net) payments under the two policies, expressed in absolute
terms and as proportions of income. These are represented in the following variables:
bt i ¼ 100 bdi ¼ taxð£Þ
bt i
yi
¼ tax as a proportion of income
bvi ¼ bt i   pmi ¼ rebated tax ðnet paymentÞ
bvi
yi
¼ rebated tax as a proportion of income;
where
p ¼
d
100
Pn
i¼1
bdiPn
i¼1mi
£ð Þ ¼ the value of the per capita revenue share
mi ¼ the number of persons aged  16 in a household
and
yi ¼ equivalised household income
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Effects of a carbon tax or ration of motor fuels on UK households. bt i and
bt i
yi
are shown
using distribution plots in Fig 8 below. The plots show the 10th and 90th percentiles, Q1, Q2,
Q3 and means of the estimate over quintiles of equivalised household income. The two mea-
sures of central tendency are shown connected to show the gradient across income quintiles.
Although we stipulate a £100/tCO2 carbon price, sincebt is simply a multiple of bd , estimated
effects at other prices can be directly inferred. For example, at £200/tCO2 each figure on the y-
axes would be doubled.
A clear feature ofbt evident in the left-side plots is its consistent positive skew. For motorists,
the mean payment exceeds Q2 by 34–40%, and in the first two quintiles is closer to Q3 than
Q2. Thus, reporting on mean effects considerably amplifies the impact on a ‘typical’ household
compared to the more representative and robust Q2 and seems particularly misleading at
lower incomes. Another interesting feature of the distributions is the relatively low gradient
between the 1st and 2nd income quintiles of motorists (2nd plot from the left). This may be an
indication that car use is mainly for essential journeys rather than leisure at lower incomes.
The higher gradient between these quintiles in the leftmost plot reflects the increase in vehicle
ownership with income.
The right hand plots show
bt i
yi
. The tax appears regressive amongst motorists (rightmost
plot), with the gradient in incomes exceeding that in absolute payments. However, the mean
proportional tax is closer to Q3 than Q2 for quintiles 1–3 indicating heavy influence by rela-
tively extreme values. For the 1st quintile, for example, it is approximately double the Q2 value
of ~3%.
The picture is more complicated for the population as a whole (2nd plot from the right), due
to low rates of vehicle ownership in the 1st and 2nd quintiles. At the mean, the policy is esti-
mated to be regressive, though
bt i
yi
does not decline monotonically across quintiles. Our results
at the mean contrast with an earlier claim in the policy literature, that taxes on motor fuels are
progressive overall, and only regressive amongst motorists [45, 46]. This difference is likely to
be attributable to increasing car ownership over time. According to the NTS, 44% of house-
holds in the lowest income quintile owned or rented a car over 2002–2008, up from 34% in
1995/1997 ([47] and own calculations). We estimate that evaluated at the median, the tax is
progressive across quintiles 1–3 but slightly regressive across 3–5. Again, the mean propor-
tional tax is closer to Q3 than Q2 for quintiles 1–3.
Effects of ‘cap and share’ or ‘tax and dividend’ for motor fuels on UK households. bvi
and
bvi
yi
are represented in Fig 9 below for a tax rate of £100/tCO2 rebated to the population. The
value of the per capita payment at this tax rate is estimated at £127. Again, effects of different
CO2 prices can be directly inferred by rescaling the axes. In these plots, in addition to the gra-
dient, it is interesting to consider the predicted proportions of the quintiles or population that
stand to win (bv<0) and lose (bv>0) financially.
Consider first the left-side plots, showing bvi. Consistently with Fig 8, there is a low gradient
between quintiles 1 and 2 in terms of absolute payments amongst motorists, reflecting broadly
similar patterns of car use. The gradient between these quintiles in the leftmost plot (compared
to the corresponding figure in Fig 8) is lower. This reflects fewer single-adult households in
quintile 2 than in quintile 1 (39% versus 58%), and consequently more dividend payments,
compensating for increased car ownership. There is again positive skew but less extreme that
in Fig 8, with means slightly closer to Q2 than to Q3. Considering winners and losers, the
mean household gains in quintiles 1–3 (all households) or 1–2 (motorist households), whereas
the median household gains in quintiles 1–4 or 1–3 respectively. Overall, only the richest
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quintile are estimated more likely to lose than gain, and most motorist households are actually
estimated to gain. Analysis at the mean conceals these features, which are highly politically
salient.
Now consider the right-side plots, showing
bvi
yi
. In contrast to Fig 8, these show strongly pro-
gressive outcomes, with relatively large percentage gains at lower incomes, paid for by rela-
tively small transfers from higher income households. In quintile 1 (all households), there is
negative skew, which occurs because a relatively small group of households do extremely well
proportionally under the policy: namely those without vehicles with very low cash incomes
and large numbers of over-16s. The mean here is closer to Q1 than Q2. The other distributions
exhibit positive skew. For example, the mean household in quintile 1 stands to gain an esti-
mated 1% of income and the median household an estimated 1.5%, a proportional gain 50%
higher.
Fig 8. Estimated monetary effects of a carbon tax or ration at £100/tCO2. Note: ‘diary sample’ weights applied, recalculated for the pooled sample.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.g008
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Lacking estimates of quantiles because of infrequency of purchase may therefore have
appreciable impact on policy analysis. Previous studies of emissions reduction policies for
motor fuels had to rely on mean consumption rates, including means for different income
bands. But a carbon tax or cap appears considerably more regressive, and its revenue-neutral
counterpart less progressive, when evaluated at the mean rather than at the median. In short,
the policy seems better with the quantile information. The picture is not uniform however,
since not all the estimated distributions exhibited positive skew. We judge that the overall pat-
tern could not be predicted simply by inspection of the underlying variables.
The p10-p90 ranges for the lowest income households in the rightmost plots of Figs 8 and 9
suggest extreme heterogeneity, which could be politically problematic since extreme cases
often receive prominent media attention. These estimates are probably affected by further data
limitations, however, since low income households may rely heavily on the benefits system,
Fig 9. Estimated monetary effects of a ‘cap and share’ or ‘tax and dividend’ policy at £100/tCO2. Note: ‘diary sample’ weights applied, recalculated
for the pooled sample.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185538.g009
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which is not accounted for in the NTS. Additional data collection would presumably be neces-
sary to better evaluate outcomes at the lowest incomes.
Finally, we note that conducting the same policy simulation using propensity scores from
model 1 to estimate bd produces almost identical results across the bulk of the distribution. The
graphs obtained corresponding to Figs 8 and 9 are visually distinguishable only at the 90th per-
centile for quintiles 4 and 5 in the left side plots (Figs D and E in S1 File). This is consistent
with our earlier observation that estimates from the two models of fuel consumption rates dif-
fer substantively only in the right tail of the distribution.
Conclusions
A simple method was presented whereby propensity scores can be used to adjust a variable
affected by a short observation window in sample surveys, a longstanding problem precluding
distributional analysis. First, match each Z = 0 unit to a Z = 1 unit on the bps to obtain br for the
former. Second, multiply each value of r (if Z = 1) and br (if Z = 0) by bps to obtain estimates of
the latent variable c of interest. The problem and method were illustrated using the UK
National Travel Survey, which contains a proxy (annual mileage) for the affected variable (fuel
purchase). The resulting estimates of fuel consumption rates are plausible judging by the dis-
tribution of household annual mileage calculated from the same survey. Estimates obtained
without recourse to the mileage proxy are also plausible, differing substantially from our pre-
ferred estimates only in the upper tail of the distribution. This is encouraging, since a proxy for
the target variable will not normally be available.
The method was then applied to conduct a static microsimulation of two emissions reduc-
tion policies for motor fuels, supposing a carbon price of £100/tCO2. Such exercises have pre-
viously had to rely on estimates of mean effects. We judge that estimating entire distributions
of effects shows the policies in a more favourable light. The distributions appear to be highly
skewed, influencing the mean appreciably, but not always in a consistent direction. This infor-
mation is timely given the outcome of the recent COP 21 meeting, which agreed targets and
aims for curtailment of global warming, but did not agree any emissions reduction policies to
achieve these.
A simple carbon tax or ration / cap would be regressive amongst motorists, but appears less
regressive evaluated at the median than at the mean. The same policy conducted in revenue-neu-
tral form, for example by redistributing revenues on an equal per-capita basis, is estimated to
benefit the majority of households in all but the top income quintile, and even the majority of
motorist households overall. These important features of the policy are hidden under analysis at
the mean. The gains would result from a relatively small estimated transfer from generally higher
income households. This is because of the high concentration of estimated motoring emissions
and their strong association with income.
Our estimation of who stands to lose and gain financially raises a key question for compari-
son of ‘tax and dividend’ and ‘cap and share’ variants of the revenue-neutral policy. The mar-
ginal propensity to consume varies inversely with income. For example, using Italian data,
Japelli and Pistaferri [48] report that the poorest households sampled spend on average c.70%
of additional income, whilst the richest spend only c.35%, and estimate that transferring 1% of
national income from the richest to the poorest income decile would increase consumption
expenditure by 0.33%, Therefore, it cannot be ruled out a priori that fuel consumption would
increase under tax and dividend, contrary to the environmental goal, despite a higher fuel
price. To address that issue requires going beyond static microsimulation. Either policy would
plausibly increase consumption expenditure overall.
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A limitation of the method presented is that one needs to know whether a unit records a
zero value because of a short observation window or for some other reason. In the NTS one
can distinguish between infrequency of purchase and non-consumption of motor fuels,
because vehicle ownership is recorded. In other consumption surveys, including the widely-
used Living Costs and Food Survey, this is not known for many items. So for a long time
econometricians have endeavoured to distinguish between non-consumption of meat, tobacco
and alcohol, for example, and infrequency of purchase. An implication of the present study is
that inclusion of a question to identify non-consumption of important items has potentially
large benefits at relatively small cost. Since this may allow researchers to apply simple matching
methods to recover the distribution of consumption rates.
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